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An Economic View of the Housing Crisis
CHRISTOPHER A. RICHARDSON
This past year, 2008, was a watershed year in terms of the devastation
in the United States residential housing market. Not since the Great
Depression have home values fallen so far and so fast. A look at current
housing market statistics such as median home prices, market inventories
of existing homes, delinquency rates, and foreclosure rates suggests that it
will be quite some time before the housing market returns to a sense of
normalcy, with much economic pain to be felt by homeowners in the
process.
With the benefit of hindsight, one can see the seeds of housing market
destruction were sown years ago through the deterioration of mortgage
underwriting standards which inflated homeownership demand beyond
sustainable levels, and the lax regulation of financial firms which
facilitated the expansion of ever more complex structured finance
derivative products without adequate capital requirements and risk
controls. It is clear that the U.S. must now plug the gaps in its regulatory
structure and take the steps necessary to provide greater transparency of
financial transactions, while laying out a clear set of comprehensive rules
of the game for financial firms going forward.
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An Economic View of the Housing Crisis
CHRISTOPHER A. RICHARDSON∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The bursting of the housing bubble in the United States left the
residential housing market in a critical state in 2008, with no clear end in
sight. By all measures, house prices in 2008 fell rapidly. According to
data from the National Association of Realtors®, the median price of
existing homes fell from a peak of nearly $222,000 in 2006 to slightly
under $181,000 in November 2008.1 Similary, the Case-Shiller compsite
index of house prices showed a precipituous year-over-year fall in prices of
18.2% from November 2007 to November 2008.2 Areas of the United
States that experienced larger increases in home prices, particularly in the
western parts of the country, saw even larger declines from 2006 to 2008.3
However, prices fell in all regions.4
The stabilization of the housing market will depend fundamentally on
achieving balance between the supply of and the demand for homes.
Experts consider the housing market to be in equilibrium when the
inventory of existing homes on the market equals about six months of

∗
At the time of The Subprime Crisis: Going Forward symposium held on November 14, 2008 at
the University of Connecticut School of Law, Dr. Richardson was a Vice President at State Street
Associates, a subsidiary of State Street Corporation. Many thanks to symposium sponsors Connecticut
Law Review and the Insurance Law Center, symposium brainchild Professor Patricia McCoy,
Managing Editor of the Connecticut Law Review Krystna Cloutier, and the Connecticut Law Review
staff. Thanks also to the participants on my panel—Marsha Courchane, Lauren Willis, and Anthony
Pennington-Cross—for sharing their insightful and timely research with symposium attendees and
participants.
1
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®, EXISTING-HOME SALES, http://www.realtor.org/wps
wcm/connect/88c8a5004cce73f7b8c7fbb7f7111181/research__EHS012609.pdf.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
&CACHEID=88c8a5004cce73f7b8c7fbb7f7111181 [hereinafter NAR SALES DATA].
2
See J.W. Elphinstone, S&P Index Sows Plunge in November Home Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE,
Jan. 27, 2009, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/SampP-Home-values-post-182-apf-14164793.html
(“Nationally, prices in Case-Shiller's 20-city index tumbled by the sharpest annual rate on record, 18.2
percent, as the deepening housing slump and national recession spared no region.”).
3
See NAR SALES DATA, supra note 1 (showing that the largest decline in sales prices occurred in
the western region of the country, where prices dropped $71,900 between 2006 and 2008); see also
Elphinstone, supra note 2 (stating that, according to Case-Shiller’s 20-city index, the cities with the
largest annual decline in home prices between November 2007 and November 2008 were Phoenix, Las
Vegas, and San Francisco).
4
See NAR SALES DATA, supra note 1 (indicating that the sales price of exisiting homes declined
in all four regions of the country between 2006 and 2008).
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supply (i.e., the existing inventory can be sold off in six months).5
Currently, there is a huge excess inventory of homes that are on the market
or vacant—in November 2008, housing inventory totaled about 4.2 million
units, representing 11.2 months of supply.6 The housing market has not
seen inventory of six months since the latter half of 2006.7 Prior to then, in
the boom year of 2005, the inventory of existing homes was 2.8 million
units, which represented only 5.1 months of supply.8
Current sales trends do not bode well for the market regaining balance
any time soon. In 2005, more than 7 million existing homes were sold.9
That figure fell to just under 6.5 million in 2006 and to 5.7 million in 2007
as the mortgage market began faltering.10 By mid-2007, existing home
sales had fallen to an annualized rate of slightly over 5 million, where they
remained until November 2008, with preliminary figures indicating a
decline to a rate of 4.49 million units.11
Meanwhile, since 2006 the number of homes on the market has
continued to grow. In 2007, the housing market softened further, with the
stock of existing homes on the market rising to nearly 4 million units,
representing almost 9 months of supply for the year.12 And in 2008 the
onset of recession, the spike in foreclosures, and the unraveling of the
credit markets decimated the demand for housing, with home inventory
fluctuating between 4 million and 4.5 million units, representing 10–11
months of supply.13 Given these trends, the moribund housing market will
not return to a sense of normalcy for some time.
In addition, there are significant headwinds pushing against the
clearing of the housing market, in particular the precipitous rise in
mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures. Data from the Mortgage
Bankers Association’s National Delinquency Survey show that 6.99% of
all mortgages outstanding were delinquent at the end of the third quarter of
2008, the highest rate ever recorded by the survey.14 However, delinquency
5
See, e.g., REALTOR Magazine Online, Absorption Rate Key to Successful Pricing, http:/
/www.realtor.org/RMODaily.nsf/pages/News2007111404?OpenDocument (last visited, Feb. 9, 2009)
(“Six months’ supply is considered a balanced market . . . .”).
6
See NAR SALES DATA, supra note 1.
7
See id. (showing that, in 2006, home inventory had risen to 3.45 million units, representing 6.5
months of supply).
8
See News Release, National Association of Realtors®, Existing-Home Sales Down in December
but 2005 Sets a Record, Jan. 24, 2006, http://www.realtor.org/press_room/news_releases/2006/
01/decehs05.
9
See id. (“There were 7,072,000 existing-home sales in all of 2005 . . . .”).
10
See NAR SALES DATA, supra note 1.
11
See NAR: Poor Economy Takes Toll on Home Sales, REALTOR MAG. ONLINE, Dec. 23, 2008,
http://www.realtor.org/RMODaily.nsf/pages/News2008122301?OpenDocument.
12
See NAR SALES DATA, supra note 1.
13
See id.
14
Delinquency is defined as loans at least one payment past due but excludes loans in foreclosure.
See Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Association, Delinquencies Increase, Foreclosure Starts Flat in
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statistics are vastly different between prime and subprime mortgages: in
the third quarter of 2008 the delinquency rate was 4.34% for prime
mortgages but was 20.03% for subprime mortgages.15 Even more
troubling are the rates of serious delinquency—mortgages ninety or more
days delinquent—as these mortgages are very likely to end up in
foreclosure without a major intervention by the lender, servicer, or
governmental entity. At the end of the third quarter of 2008, a whopping
19.56% of subprime mortgages outstanding were seriously delinquent,
compared with 2.87% of prime mortgages.16 Moreover, both the rate and
the level of serious delinquency is much higher for subprime mortgages:
the subprime rate increased 1.71 percentage points from the year-ago
quarter, while the prime rate rose a smaller, but still vexing, 0.52
percentage points from a year ago.17
In many cases, the end result of serious mortgage delinquency is
foreclosure. In the foreclosure process, the social burden of the weakened
housing market manifests itself to the greatest extent. A foreclosed home
is a losing proposition for borrowers, lenders, servicers, investors,
neighborhoods, and state and local governments—particularly in a
recessionary economic environment where a glut of homes on the market
already exists.
Unfortunately, the mortgage delinquency statistics
discussed above point to a continued increase in the already record-setting
number of foreclosed homes for the foreseeable future. In the third quarter
of 2008, nearly 3% of loans were in foreclosure, a percentage that was 1.28
percentage points higher than one year ago.18 The rate of foreclosure starts
in the third quarter of 2008 was 1.07%, virtually unchanged from the
previous quarter, but 0.29 percentage points higher than one year ago.19
Before one can think in a meaningful way about possible solutions to
the current housing market crisis, it is important to consider the forces that
contributed to the market’s current state. The next section provides a brief
discussion of the confluence of forces that brought the housing market to
its current weakened state.
II. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CURRENT MARKET DISTRESS
As discussed in the Article by Marsha Courchane, one clear contributer
to the problems in the mortgage and housing markets was weak mortgage

the Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Dec. 5, 2008), http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/
PressCenter/66626.htm.
15
See id. (citing delinquency rates of 12.92% and 7.28% for FHA and VA loans, respectively).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
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underwriting standards.
The Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer
Survey seems to suggest that underwriting standards began to deteriorate in
late 2005. However, underwriting standards probably began loosening in
2004; stimulative monetary policy by the Federal Reserve pushed
mortgage rates down to record lows and a steep yield curve provided banks
and mortgage lenders with incentives to fund the origination of adjustablerate mortgages with low-cost short-term debt, with the expectation that the
mortgages would be refinanced before the fixed-rate terms ended. One key
problem with mortgage underwriting standards over the past several years
was that they were predicated on the assumption of continued increases in
house prices.21 Mortgages with more accommodating underwriting
terms—Alt-A and subprime loans in particular—were made under terms
that made them unsuitable to be held by borrowers for long periods of
time. Perhaps the most widespread examples were the hybrid adjustablerate mortgage (ARMs) featuring a low “teaser” interest rate for the fixedrate time period, which increased substantially thereafter. The rationale
behind the popularity of ARMs was the expectation that such loans could
be refinanced into new loans with more affordable monthly payments
before the lower fixed-rate period of the loan term ended. Borrowers
would be able to refinance, so the reasoning went, as long as home values
continued to increase. Such reasoning was also behind the introduction of
the option-adjustable mortgage (“option ARM”), a mortgage that allows
the borrower to choose to make monthly payments that are less than the
monthly interest charges, thus resulting in “negative amortization.”
Mortgages with “exotic” underwriting features such as “teaser” rates
on ARMs, negative amortization, interest-only (IO) amortization, reduced
(or no) documentation of income and assets (so-called “low-doc” or “nodoc” loans), and high loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) helped fuel the explosive
growth in the demand for mortgages and homes during 2003–2006. This
increased demand led home builders to build more (and larger) homes,
thereby increasing the supply of housing, which led to increased demand
for more and larger mortgages; this continued in a virtuous cycle.
Virtuous, that is, until the appetite for assets backed by non-prime (Alt-A
and subprime) mortgages abruptly vanished in late 2006 and early 2007.
Although the precise chain of causality is somewhat unclear (was the drop
in secondary market demand for subprime mortgages caused by falling
house prices, or did house prices start falling because subprime borrowers
could not refinance as a result of a drop in secondary market demand?), it
20
See generally Marsha J. Courchane, Loan Originations/ Underwriting Standards: Recovering
From the Subprime Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
21
See Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007, 3–4, 19–34 (Yale Univ. Int’l Ctr. for Fin. Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 08-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1255362#.
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is fairly clear that as the performance of mortgages continued to deteriorate
(first subprime and Alt-A mortgages, then prime mortgages as well), the
structured securities created or derived from those mortgages—mortgageand asset-backed securities (MBS/ABS), and collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs)—began to lose value and become more risky, and the
demand and liquidity for these securities was decimated.
Another factor contributing to the housing crisis was the failure of
bank regulatory agencies—the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the FDIC, and the Federal
Reserve—to require and enforce a tightening of mortgage underwriting
standards before house prices leveled off.22 In the regulatory and economic
environment in place during 2003–2006, one with a vibrant economy
driven in large part by cheap financing and few prohibitions on risky
lending, financial firms sprinted well ahead of their regulators by
engineering new financial products that allowed banks and investors to
create, package, re-package and sell cash flows that we now know carried
considerably more risk than standard products. Many of these products,
such as CDO tranches and credit derivatives, contained not only the normal
risk directly associated with the characteristics of the assets underlying the
products, but added on a layer of counterparty risk, where the actions of
secondary parties to the transaction may impact the value of the underlying
assets of a financial product in ways that are difficult or impossible to
quantify.23 Unfortunately, the increase in systemic risk created by these
products often is not observable at the time the products are structured,
given the tendency for new financial products to be structured at times that
are favorable to the structurers and investors. Consequently, regulators
may be reluctant to impose restrictions on new financial products until
there is evidence that there is a problem. Sometimes, as was the case with
the current credit crisis, by then it is too late.
Given the benefit of hindsight, it is likely that early implementation of
restrictions and oversight of the use of mortgages with particularly risky
combinations of “exotic” features would have ameliorated the riskiness of
market transactions. The Article on product innovations by Souphala
Chomsisengphet, Timothy Murphy, and Anthony Pennington-Cross,
provides empirical evidence on the mismatch between mortgage borrowers
and the mortgages they received during the housing market bubble

22
Two related factors in the overheating of the housing market were the push by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to promote homeownership at the expense of focus on the
availability of affordable rental housing, and HUD's reluctance to regulate underwriting for
independent mortgage lenders that did not fall directly under the regulatory purview of the bank
regulatory agencies.
23
For a comprehensive narrative of the role of CDOs and credit derivatives in the credit crisis, see
Gorton, supra note 21, at 34–45.
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period.
For example, their analysis indicates that 2007 interest-only
mortgages were used in the Pacific region about four times more often than
the amount predicted by economic and financial conditions, and nonamortizing loans in the Pacific region were used about 20 percentage
points more often than predicted.25
Such misallocations of mortgage products are indicative of the type of
decision failures discussed in the Article by Lauren Willis—in particular,
failures that lead to inefficient transactions and are difficult to correct
given the institutional barriers currently existing in the mortgage market.26
Despite the deficiencies in the regulation of mortgage products, lax
underwriting by itself was not enough to ignite a global financial crisis.
Systemic risk in the financial system was propagated by the winds of
securitization—the packaging of mortgages and other debt instruments into
MBSs, CDOs, and other structured products. The securitization of
mortgages provided a way for investors to invest in fixed-income products
tied to mortgages and other types of loans, ostensibly without having to
assess the credit risk of each individual borrower. Moreover, the tranche
structure of MBSs created layers of bonds featuring different coupon rates
and levels of prepayment and default risk, depending on the tranche's
rating and priority in the “waterfall” structure of the MBS. These
individual tranches could then be sold directly to investors or bundled with
other tranches from different MBSs (or other types of structured products
backed by various types of assets) in the form of CDOs.
While a thorough discussion of CDOs is beyond the scope of this
Article, a key complication with CDOs is that computing their values is
made difficult by the disconnect between the cash flows of each underlying
asset and the cash flows of the various tranches of the CDO. In fact, many
CDOs backed by subprime mortgages received the highest AAA rating
from private ratings agencies.27 Due to the difficulty of modeling and
accurately pricing CDO tranches, investors for the most part relied heavily
on the ratings given to the securities by the ratings agencies. This head-inthe-sand investing approach worked for investors as long as cash flows on
the securities were not impaired (i.e., low defaults and high prepayments).
24

See Souphala Chomsisengphet et al., Product Innovation & Mortgage Selection in the
Subprime Era 5–6 (Oct. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=128876.
25
Id. at 11–12, 32.
26
Lauren Willis, Will the Mortgage Market 'Correct'?, 41 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
Willis lists as supply-side barriers to market correction: (i) characteristics of modern lending profit
models, namely risk spreading, diversification and hedging, risk-based pricing, and pool-based
profitability; (ii) limits on disciplining brokers and originators; (iii) limits on aligning servicer
incentives; and (iv) no incentive to internalize social costs of the particular types of mortgages being
provided. Demand-side barriers to market correction include (i) a lack of responsiveness of borrowers
to price signals; (ii) poorly calibrated borrower responses to risk; and (iii) unmoored risk preferences.
Id.
27
See Gorton, supra note 21, at 32–33 (providing a chart with ratings data from Moody’s,
Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch, the major private ratings agencies).
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Investors did not have to concern themselves very much with pricing and
valuing opaque CDOs, as there was an active, liquid market for them
which provided pricing data with which they could mark their portfolios to
(mainly favorable) market prices. Once the underlying assumptions about
house price appreciation were breached, however, the ratings were shown
to be unreliable.
The role of CDOs and other structured products in the crisis should not
be underestimated. CDOs allow credit risk, market risk and liquidity risk
to be packaged, sold, and hedged to investors willing to absorb those risks.
However, it appears that the market was missing a backstop mechanism to
ensure that investors that were willing to absorb credit, market, and
liquidity risks from other parties were actually able to absorb them. The
collapse and subsequent bailout of AIG is a prime example of the perils of
allowing the existence of what is essentially a specialized insurance
market—in AIG’s case, the market for credit default swaps—without
imposing controls—i.e., capital requirements—on the insurance writers to
provide some assurance they will be able to honor their obligations to all
counterparties. Without such a backstop, systemic risk can grow virtually
unchecked as counterparty risk rises.
III. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
The collapse of liquidity that spread through the global financial
system had its origin in the market failures evident in the residential
mortgage market. When all is said and done, trillions of dollars will have
been spent by governments around the world in an effort to revive and
restore credit markets. Given the enormity of the economic problems we
face both nationally and globally, where do we go from here?
A viable blueprint for reforming the regulatory foundation of the US
financial system was provided in a speech by then-Senator Barack Obama
in March 2008—several months before both the meltdown in the debt
markets in October 2008 and his election as President on November 4,
2008:
[T]here needs to be general reform of the requirements to
which all regulated financial institutions are subjected.
Capital requirements should be strengthened, particularly
for complex financial instruments like some of the
mortgage securities that led to our current crisis. We
must develop and rigorously manage liquidity risk. We
must investigate rating agencies and potential conflicts of
interest with the people they are rating.
And
transparency requirements must demand full disclosure
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and

President Obama’s speech, heavily influenced by the ideas of former
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker,29 masterfully touched upon the
major issues and provided an economically sound blueprint for
strengthening and revamping the regulatory system. With regard to the
excerpt above, two further actions should be considered. First, given the
pervasiveness of lax underwriting in the current crisis, one key element to
re-establishing a properly functioning housing market will be to tighten
mortgage underwriting standards. To a large extent this has already
happened.30 Further tightening could take the form of prohibiting certain
types of mortgages with questionable consumer value—particularly
mortgages that allow for negative amortization. Second, improved
disclosure and transparency requirements will be effective only to the
extent that financial products are structured in a way that allows them to be
accurately priced. Transparency, therefore, must apply to the individual
assets constituting structured securities. If structured securities are to be
viable investment vehicles in the future, they must be structured in ways
that can be properly modeled and priced by the market.31 Ultimately,
reviving the residential housing market will require rebuilding and
strengthening our regulatory foundation in ways that allow the market to
function properly, while ensuring that the mistakes of some do not
undermine the well-being of all.

28
Senator Barack Obama, Speech at Cooper Union: Renewing the American Economy 6 (Mar.
27, 2008), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/mmemmottpdf/obama-econ-speech-3-272008.pdf).
29
See Edward Harrison, Paul Volcker: Obama’s Other Economic Advisor, CREDIT WRITEDOWNS,
Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.creditwritedowns.com/2008/10/paul-volcker-obamas-other-economic.html
(emphasizing the importance of former Chairman Volker’s addition to President Obama’s economic
team).
30
See Memorandum, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, The January 2009 Senior Loan
Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey/200902/default.htm (“In the January survey, the net
fractions of respondents that reported having tightened their lending policies on all major loan
categories over the previous three months stayed very elevated.”).
31
Under this standard, so-called “CDO-squareds” (CDOs that contain other CDOs as underlying
assets) and other manifestations of “derivatives of derivatives” would not be permitted.

